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The Wisdom and Enforceability of Welfare Rights as Constitutional Rights*
by Herman Schwartz**
For many people in the former communist bloc, the collapseof communism has been a very mixed blessing. There isobviously more freedom in most of these countries, but the
modest economic security on which so many people relied is now
gone and this in turn threatens democracy. This is not just a prob-
lem for countries in transition. The development of global capi-
talism and the dominance of market thinking have resulted in mas-
sive inequalities in many countries. In the United States, perhaps
the richest country in world history, one in five children lives in
poverty. As market capitalism sweeps the western and other parts
of the world, the problem of inequality will grow.
At the same time, the last half-century has seen the ascendancy
of the judiciary. This is the age of the judges. The establishment
in much of the world of constitutional courts is perhaps the most
prominent example of this development. These tribunals exercise
immense powers in many areas and thus have had to confront the
severe economic and social problems growing out of the transition
to a market economy. The broad jurisdiction of these tribunals is
due in part to the framework of these constitutions. Like consti-
tutions elsewhere in the world, and unlike the United States con-
stitution, East European constitutions contain extensive lists of social
welfare rights and governmental obligations, which have been
brought before their constitutional courts. These rights include the
right to basic subsistence, food, clothing, housing, health care, edu-
cation, special protection for mothers and children, and the right
to work in its many facets, including the right to safe and fair con-
ditions of work, to form trade unions, and to strike.
Whether economic and social rights should be included in
new constitutions has been hotly debated among academics. As a
practical matter, this is largely a non-issue now because almost all
the constitutions adopted since 1945 contain a relatively full com-
plement of such rights, in a variety of formulations. To most U.S.
lawyers, however, including social welfare rights in a constitution
verges on the unthinkable. Partly this is because Americans have
been taught to think that constitutional rights depend on judicial
enforceability almost by definition, and most U.S. lawyers believe
that courts can enforce only negative rights, rights that deny power,
and cannot impose positive obligations upon government, which
social welfare rights do.
For purposes of discussion, there are two arguments against con-
stitutionalizing social welfare rights: (1) whether they are judicially
enforceable; and (2) whether it is consistent with a free, democ-
ratic, market-oriented civil society to have such rights in a consti-
tution.
Before turning to these questions, however, a preliminary
clearing away is necessary. Insofar as the issue is put in terms of the
contrast between positive and negative rights, it should first be noted
that many of the so-called social rights at issue are essentially neg-
ative rights. Some of these, such as the right to form unions, are
just variations of the right to freely associate, a traditional negative
right. The related right to strike includes the right to be free
from interference with strikes, also a negative right. Even so out-
landish seeming a right as the right to a clean environment will
often call for just stopping public and private actors from pollut-
ing the atmosphere or the land, which is similar to traditional pub-
lic-nuisance litigation. 
Many of these social rights also are closely related to rights that
are indisputably negative. The most significant of these is the
right to be free from discrimination. Most countries already have
statutes creating rights to public health care, education, maternity
benefits, housing, social security, and similar benefits. In the
enforcement of such statutory rights, the right of putative recipi-
ents to be free from discrimination has been routinely invoked. 
Discrimination is not the only possible abuse of these rights.
Established social programs may be administered in ways
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implicating other recognized “negative” rights. Benefits can and
have been denied to people because of their outspokenness, reli-
gion, or political affiliation. Such denials implicate freedom of
speech, religion, and association. This implication of negative
rights also applies to an interference with the right to work, and
can come up in the context of hiring, discharge, or unfair work-
ing conditions.
Moreover, some social rights that require courts to order affir-
mative remedial measures involve traditional judicial functions.
The right to safe working conditions is a good example. Courts
frequently enforce this right in statutory, common law, and even
constitutional cases. 
The courts’ role in commanding specific positive action, and
not limiting themselves to prohibiting lawless acts, raises a larger
consideration. As the late Harvard Law School Professor Abram
Chayes pointed out 25 years ago, even U.S. courts have moved far
beyond the narrow roles they used to play, and are engaged
today in a wide variety of affirmative activities, ranging from
supervision of school desegregation, prisons, and nursing homes,
to monitoring corrupt unions. In all these cases, courts are doing
much more than merely saying “No.” Rather, they are actually set-
ting standards, and in many cases requiring the expenditure of
public money. 
It is this latter point—court-ordered expenditures of public
money— that raises the problems to which the criticism of con-
stitutionalizing rights is primarily addressed. Suppose there is
no health care or housing or educational system. By what author-
ity does a court tell a legislature that it must create such a program?
The exercise of such a power by a court raises issues relating to
continued on next page
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separation of powers, budgetary priorities, and judicial compe-
tence. Moreover, it can induce conflicts within societies, for it
involves reordering fundamental priorities, which historically
has fallen within the province of the representative branches. And
suppose there is so little money that the programs cannot be estab-
lished. Won’t there be disillusionment with democracy if such
rights are not implemented?
This problem is more theoretical than real because almost all
modern nations already have public health care, education, social
security, and other benefits. The problems that arise usually revolve
around the discriminatory or arbitrary administration of existing
programs with which courts have been dealing for a long time. 
Where healthcare, education, and social security programs do
not exist, should the courts order the creation of such a benefit
system? Americans wince at the thought that a court may order
a legislature to pass legislation or spend money, even though much
that United States and other courts do requires the expenditure
of substantial funds on pain of contempt or some other sanction. 
By contrast, many European and other constitutional courts
do not seem at all reluctant to tell legislatures they must adopt
specific legislation. For instance, in the early 1990s the Hungar-
ian Court ordered the parliament to pass legislation protecting
minorities and to establish a system of radio and television reg-
ulation. Though each took a long time to enact, the court orders
were ultimately obeyed. Such judicial
orders to a parliament to act, while
not common, are not unusual, and in
some cases, the court’s authority to
issue such orders is constitutionally
authorized. 
A legislature may, of course, refuse
to follow the court’s direction. Will
this not weaken a court and indeed
the rule of law itself, perhaps irrepara-
bly? Perhaps, but it is not likely. From
time to time, courts have been defied, but this has not necessar-
ily impaired their prestige, so long as such defiance was isolated
and not routine. 
The most implausible argument of all is that non-enforcement
of some social rights will depreciate the currency of all or other
rights, and of the rule of law itself. There is simply no evidence
whatsoever that the denial or non-enforceability of some rights
prejudices the enforcement of others, whether in the United States
or elsewhere. 
Nor does it follow that the presence of rights in a constitution
requires that they be judicially enforceable for them to be mean-
ingful. There is also political enforceability. An obligation that is
constitutionally mandated will have more persuasive force in
debates over budget and other priorities than something that is
completely discretionary with the legislature. Proponents of uni-
versal health care and those concerned about the poor and
needy might have fared better in the health care debates if health
care and welfare were considered matters of constitutional right.
Nor does this mean that courts will second-guess the ade-
quacy of governmental programs to effectuate such rights. In most
countries, courts exercise very little supervision over the details
of such programs, so long as there is no discrimination or other
arbitrary application, and proper procedures are employed.
Nevertheless, questions remain: why should these rights be
included in a constitution? Why should the relevant demands
and needs not be left to the discretion of changing legislative
majorities? 
The answers to these questions depend on how one views a con-
stitution. A constitution is more than a legal document. Drawing
on a nation’s experience of the past and its hopes for the future,
it is the foundation charter of the national polity. Constitutions
create a set of mechanisms and values that are beyond the power
of ordinary legislative majorities to change. Obviously, these
include the mechanisms for the distribution of power, which
are the most controversial everywhere and always. Further, con-
stitutions ensure that the fundamental values of society are also
rendered immune to transient legislative majorities.
In the United States and in most western societies, we have long
accepted the fundamental nature of the basic civil and political
rights. Almost all societies, save the United States, have also rec-
ognized the prime importance of social rights. Far from such rights
being newly sprung from the paternalistic soil of communism,
these rights go back at least to former U.S. president Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms, which were prefigured in his 1941
State of the Union speech. They are enumerated in the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as in constitu-
tions as conservative as the French Gaullist Constitution of 1958,
and in the Italian, Spanish, Japanese, and virtually every other
nation’s constitution. This is because social rights are inextrica-
bly intertwined with civil and political rights. Destitute hungry peo-
ple don’t vote, and hungry people with no work to occupy them
have no patience with the slow, often tedious haggling among
sharply differing groups, and the resulting slow progress that is
characteristic of democracy.
Finally, it has also been argued that positive rights impose a
constitutional duty on governments to interfere with markets. But
the mere presence of such rights in
the Polish or Hungarian constitu-
tions, and the enforcement of these
rights by their constitutional courts,
hasn’t interfered with the Polish or
Hungarian free market reforms.
Moreover, this is not really an argu-
ment against putting these rights
into the constitutions, but against
having them at all, for there is no rea-
son to think that it is the constitu-
tionalization of these rights that is crucial. Regardless of whether
the programs implementing such rights are in a statute adopted
by a politically created majority, or result from governmental
action fulfilling a constitutional duty, the interference with the
market is the same. The fact that the interference results from an
entrenched constitutional mandate rather than from an enact-
ment by a transient legislative majority does not affect the fact or
degree of interference. 
It is now clear beyond dispute that a free society, dedicated to
democracy and the rule of law, cannot be either established or
maintained if people are hungry, homeless, sick, or uneducated.
It is also becoming clear that, except in unusual circumstances,
freedom, democracy, and their associated civil and political
rights, are necessary for long-term economic and social stability.
Few dispute the courts’ role in promoting the traditional civil and
political rights. But there also must be fairness and equity in the
distribution of society’s benefits, particularly those public bene-
fits that are necessary to live a decent life, and especially during
periods of economic and social privation. Experience in Europe,
India, South Africa, and elsewhere demonstrates that while courts
cannot abolish economic privation, they can provide at least
some of the necessary fairness and equity. 
* This article is excerpted from “Should Social and Economic Rights Be
Included In A Constitution?,” an essay for a Festschrift in honor of Pro-
fessor Helmut Steinberger. The essay was prepared for the Heidelberg
Germany Max Planck Institute of Comparative Public Law and Inter-
national Law.
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